Proof test results were analyzed and compared with a proposed life cycle curve or hazard function and the limit of useful life.
INTRODUCTION
Spring operated pressure relief valves perform an important safety function in the process industries by not allowing system pressures to exceed maximum system design pressure. Spring operated relief valves complying with ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (BPVC), Section I and Section VIII for fired and unfired pressure vessels are required to be inspected, tested and serviced on a periodic basis. Since a test period is not strictly specified, what typically establishes the maintenance interval is a company guidance document or past plant history. At most sites, system outage for safety relief valve maintenance is costly and may be performed as often as on an annual basis. But what if relief valves at the time of maintenance are still in proper working order and in good physical condition, in other words have remaining useful life? Could the valve be left in service for another year without a statistically significant increase in the PFD?
Maintenance intervals or valve useful life are best optimized by studying past reliability (performance) data. The Savannah River Site (SRS) joined a pressure relief valve reliability improvement group in 2005. Members of the chemical and gas industry share inventory and event data to quantify reliability based on "proof test" results. The proof test can also be considered the "as-found" condition or the expected lift pressure of the relief valve at the time it is removed from service. A ratio of proof test pressure to set pressure (R) of 1.5 or greater in the as-found condition is considered by industry to be"stuck shut" or the PFD meaning that the device would likely have failed on demand during an actual over pressure event. The ratio (R) of 1.1 gives an indication of the end of useful life since 10% is the maximum allowed overpressure by the BPVC.
Pressure relief valve test intervals may be safely extended when supported by quality test data, statistical tools, and failure analysis. Design, maintenance and operating changes resulting from data and failure analysis can provide significant reliability improvements and reduced costs over the lifetime of a valve. At most sites, system outages for safety relief valve maintenance are costly and may be performed as often as on an annual basis lacking data to support a longer service period. Without trend data and analyses to support test intervals, a pressure relief valve may still be in acceptable working order when removed for maintenance. A valve might be left in service longer, perhaps for another year if failure rates were not expected to increase over the period.
1 However, quality test data and statistical tools are needed to support that statement as being credible. The known distribution of spring operated relief valve failures seems to follow the classic bathtub curve at least in the Intrinsic and Wearout Failure Periods.
HAZARD FUNCTION AND THE BATHTUB CURVE
What if relief valves at the time of required maintenance were still in proper working order and in good physical condition, that is still in the intrinsic failure period? Could the valve be left in service for another year without a statistically significant increase in the probability of failure on demand?
Conceptually, if the failure rate is flat or expected to be statistically the same next year, then a facility could leave the pressure relief valve in service for another year at little additional risk. The hazard function, used to quantify failure likelihood over time, is defined as the failure rate at time t conditional on survival until time t or later. The hazard function is also refered to as the force of mortality in other fields of application. The hazard function may be increasing or decreasing, nonmonotonic, or discontinuous. An example is the bathtub curve hazard function, which is large for small values of t, decreasing to some minimum, and thereafter increasing again; this can model the property of some mechanical systems to either failure soon after operation, or much later, as the system ages. The lifetime or useful life of a component could be used to describe the intrinsic failure period where failures are random and occur at a relatively steady rate.
We originally observed that the failure rate for pressure relief valves was "flat" or no-slope from 1 -5 years in service. 3, 4 Chart 1 is an accumulation of several quality data sets showing the hazard function for R>=1.50 related to time in service. Only valves with greater than one year in survive were used to determine the impact of time in service. There appears to be an upturn between years 6 and 8 but is not pronounced enough to be convincing without corroboration from additional data at greater times. There is insufficient data to plot failures in the early failure period because few if any valves are being removed from service in less than one year. Those that were removed during that time period were not found to be failed. Additional test data is needed to determine if the up-slope occurs between 6 and 8 years or if useful life extends through the time period. The number of failures for R>=1.50 is sparse (N<5) for each of the time intervals over the testing range.
Chart 1-Hazard function vs. Time in Service (Years)
It is difficult to calculate or predict the end of the maintenance cycle or useful life without being able to confirm the upward turning point on the wear out curve. There are very few failures recorded for 6 -10 years in service. This facility is hesitant to extend intervals beyond 6 years because that presents unknown risk. One study reported probabilities of failure in clean gas service out to almost 10 years showing a strong upturn at year six as represented in Chart 2 (Appendix Data). 5 Our test data falls within the same footprint as the referenced data when overlaid on this plot. 
RELIEF VALVE PROOF TESTING PROCEDURES
At this site, valves from ¼ inch inlet to 8 inch inlet are removed from service in the field on a schedule from 1-5 years and in rare controlled situations 7 years. Valves are checked in to the qualified shop for inspection, test and repairs if needed. An as found condition or proof test is performed after visual examination of the valve body, the inlet and the outlet ports. The proof test is recorded and is considered to be the value at which the valve would have lifted in an actual demand. Failure to open prior to 1.5 times the cold set pressure (valve name plate) causes the proof test to be recorded as failure to open. The shop is authorized to increase the pressure to 2 times set pressure in an attempt pop the valve. New valves are also proof tested prior to installation just as if they had been in service. Root cause failure analysis is performed on all failed valves and the results characterized in site wide Bulletins.
DATA COLLECTION PROCESS
The valve must first pass an initial visual external inspection before testing. If the proof test is within 10% of the set pressure and the average of the next three tests are within 3% of the set point, then the valve has passed test and inspection without requiring further work. Any valve proof testing higher than 1.1 times set pressure is disassembled for "repair". Once the proof test is complete and the data recorded, the valve is tested three more times and the pop pressures recorded to provide an "average" pop pressure.
Current Guidelines for Re test / Repair
Present guidelines for inspection are listed in Table 1 Visual inspection of internals and parts replaced are then immediately recorded in the computerized maintenance management system.
METHODS AND PRACTICES FOR IMPROVING RELIEF VALVE PERFORMANCE (RELIABILITY)

Figure -2 New relief valve stored for 5 years
Lacking sufficient data on which to base a decision, it is often considered easiest to improve reliability by shortening the time in service. That however, is not cost effective over the life cycle and may not even improve performance if the primary failure mode is not corrosion or high stress in service. The valve pictured in Figure 2 was stored in a warehouse where the temperature was to have been from 40-140 degrees Fahrenheit. Plastic stoppers were applied to the inlet and outlet at the factory to serve as foreign material exclusion. Shop performed the mandatory pre-installation test (proof test) but stopped at 2 times set pressure without the valve lifting. Corroded surfaces and corrosion debris were present on the outlet side of the valve. All the internals are stainless steel (SS); the body is carbon steel. The SS316 disc and SS316 nozzle seating area were stuck together by a film of undetermined oxides or metal-to-metal embedment. Preinstallation proof testing or day-zero verification of set pressure prior to service is an excellent way to improve performance. It has been found that two different corrosionrelated failures occur over time. As in the situation above, the stainless steel disc bonds to the seat over time. That condition is also found after 3-5 years in the field.
The second failure cause is typical for stainless steel valves with carbon steel springs and carbon steel spring washers especially for those valves exposed to the elements. In this second case, carbon steel components rust and the corrosion products bind the spring washer inner diameters to the stainless steel valve stem. Once corrosion products have formed between washer and the stem, the stem can no longer slide upwards in the spring washers. Consequently the disc cannot move off the seat, and the valve is stuck shut.
In Figure 3 it can be seen that even after disassembly the carbon steel spring washers have not released their grip from the stainless steel valve stem. The stem is still held tightly in the two spring washers. For certain problem valves, our recommendation is to replace carbon steel with stainless steel spring washers. Most valve manufacturers now offer them. Exposure to the elements was mentioned earlier since corrosion on the discharge side will be accelerated by the presence of moisture or pooled water. Installing packed levers, bellows kits, closed caps, or rain hats will prevent intrusion of rain water. With the open cap design, the discharge side of the valve will fill to spring washer height or more.
Figure 3 Compressor Cooling Water Relief Valve
Humidity will cause corrosion too, but the damage to carbon steel parts has been found to be less severe and it seems to take a longer period of time to accumulate to failure. Drain or weep holes should be drilled in the upturned discharge pipe stub. The discharge pipe stub directs the valve discharge upwards away from personnel, but rainwater can again fill the pipe unless a drain hole at the bottom of the elbow is provided. Figure 4 shows a frequent failure mode for reciprocating air compressors. The final discharge valve moves with the compressor discharge piping and the resulting accelerations cause the disc to beat itself out against the nozzle. It can be seen in the photo that a ridge has worn in the disc, and the nozzle edges are rolled over (they both started out flat). The use of a more sturdy material (stainless steel) or isolation of the discharge piping from the compressor vibrations will increase valve life. 
Soft Seated Valves
Of the distribution of relief valves failing high, (R) >/= 1.10 we find that 37% are small diameter (1/2 inch or less) with elastomer seats [145/388] . Compare that with 10% of the total valve population both hard and soft seat failing high. Of the soft seat relief valves, 13% were in service for 3 years or more and 83% [120/145] were new valves. Significant improvement can be made in overall reliability if the use of ¼, 3/8, and ½ inch inlet soft-seated valves is minimized.
COST-BENEFIT ESTIMATES nozzle disc
On the right side Table 2 summarizes the labor hours and associated costs for maintenance per valve. On the left side are shown the potential savings based on the number of valves listed in each case. Case 1 for example indicates that we have 31 relief valves at this plant that are now on a 2 year maintenance interval. Supported by statistical analysis of test and other performance data, maintenance could be extended to 3 years. Now, in a 6 year period, one maintenance cycle will be avoided, thus the savings factor for one year is 1/6 of the cost per outage ($2274) resulting in an annual savings of $11,772 (0.
In the example given above, an average of $4450 ($222.50 x 20) could be saved over a 20 year service life for each valve. For the entire group of 2338 valves an expenditure of $10.4 million (2238 x $4450) might be avoided performing unnecessary maintenance and testing. Another way to look at life cycle cost is to start with annual (1-year) maintenance at $2274 per valve for the first two maintenance cycles, then move to 3 year intervals for two maintenance cycles, and finally to 5 year intervals justifying extensions with test and inspection data. Tracking reliability all the way to ensure the 
APPENDIX: DATA TABLES Chart 1 Data
The hazard function is estimated using the actuarial method for grouped data presented in Lawless 7 (1982) where the probability of failure is adjusted for the valves that didn't fail (censored tests) within each time interval. Time (Years) is the average time over all valves within the time interval. Valves less than ½ year in service were not included in the plot because of low exposure to in-service conditions. The Hazard estimate for new valves was not included The time span for each time interval is approximately one year except for the last time interval (6-13 years). Since the failure time for units with R>1.50 is not known, the initial time is taken to be zero in calculating the hazard rate for each interval. 
